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ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING 
HOW BROADLY THE COURTS SHOULD READ § 
203(Y) OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 
Robert Haimes* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Firefighters, emergency medical technicians (EMTs), and paramedics 
are used to saving the public in moments of need.  Recently, however, 
these individuals have asked the court system to come to their rescue.  
They want the courts to interpret the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to 
enable them to claim additional overtime benefits by concluding that they 
do not fall within a public employee exemption to the Act.1 
The FLSA states that an employer may not allow its employee to work 
for more than forty hours in a workweek unless the employer pays the 
employee “time-and-a-half” for the hours spent working over forty hours.2  
Section 207(k), however, exempts a “public agency” from subsection (a)'s 
overtime requirements with respect to various categories of employees, 
including individuals engaged in “fire protection activities.”3  Section 
203(y) defines an employee engaged in fire protection activities as: 
 
*University of Pennsylvania Law School, Class of 2010.  University of Virginia, Class of 
2002. 
 1. This issue has arisen because of a change in the operations of fire departments 
around the country.   This change resulted from cities recognizing that they had an increased 
need for emergency medical services and a decreased need for firefighting services.  Thus, 
fire departments began deploying their employees to emergency medical calls.  Benton J. 
Matthis Jr. & Dana Kristin Maine, When are Firefighters Truly Firefighters, 67 DEF. 
COUNSEL J. 260, 261 (2000). 
 2. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (2006). 
 3. 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (2006). 
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an employee, including a firefighter, paramedic, emergency 
medical technician, rescue worker, ambulance personnel, or 
hazardous materials worker, who-- 
(1) is trained in fire suppression, has the legal authority and 
responsibility to engage in fire suppression, and is employed by a 
fire department of a municipality, county, fire district, or State; 
and 
(2) is engaged in the prevention, control, and extinguishment of 
fires or response to emergency situations where life, property, or 
the environment is at risk.4 
This issue is important because it has a significant impact on city 
budgets, which are already constrained.  In addition to future labor costs, 
municipalities face substantial costs in back pay, attorneys’ fees, and court 
costs if they are deemed to have violated the FLSA.  Currently, 
municipalities are in an especially difficult position because of a circuit 
split over how to interpret the FLSA.  This split leaves cities both uncertain 
about how to structure their employees’ working environment and 
potentially liable for substantial damages.  It has been estimated that the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding, which stated that quasi-firefighters5 were covered 
by the normal overtime rules rather than the fire protection exemption, if 
adopted nationally, could cost municipalities $500 million per year in 
overtime, administrative, and litigation costs.6 
This issue is also important because Congress had previously 
recognized that jurisdictions were interpreting the FLSA differently in this 
area and amended the Act to clarify the confusion.  The amendment has 
been unsuccessful on this front and has led to a significant amount of 
litigation by paramedics and others claiming they should not be considered 
fire-protection employees under the amended act. 
Part II of this Comment briefly discusses the FLSA, its background 
and purpose, its initial interpretation, and the 1999 amendment which is 
currently at issue.  Part III provides an overview of the circuit split in this 
area.  The Third and Ninth Circuits have adopted a narrow interpretation of 
the fire protection exemption and thus have ruled that many quasi-
firefighters were entitled to greater overtime payments from their city 
employers.  The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a broad 
interpretation and have included these employees within the fire protection 
exemption, thus denying them the additional overtime benefits they were 
seeking.  After delineating factual differences in these cases which could 
 
 4. 29 U.S.C. § 203(y) (2006). 
 5. I use this term to refer to the broad group of Emergency Medical Technicians, 
Paramedics, Ambulance Personnel, and Rescue Service Workers who assert that they 
engage in fire protection activities under the FLSA. 
 6. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 325 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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lead courts to different conclusions, this Comment will argue that the 
circuit courts have drawn fundamentally different legal conclusions as to 
how to interpret the FLSA.  Part IV, utilizing the tools of statutory 
construction prescribed by the Supreme Court, asserts that the broader 
interpretation of the exemption is the proper interpretation of the Act.  Part 
V provides a brief conclusion and recommends that the Supreme Court 
grant certiorari to clarify this issue or that Congress should more explicitly 
specify which city employees are entitled to payment under the normal 
overtime rules and thus do not fall under the fire protection exemption. 
II.  HISTORY OF THE FLSA 
The FLSA was passed during the Great Depression to address the 
prevalent issues of low wages, high unemployment, and long working 
hours.7  Originally, the Act exempted states and their political subdivisions 
from its coverage.8  In 1966, Congress removed this exemption and 
amended the FLSA by extending its provisions to the states and their 
political subdivisions operating certain schools, hospitals, nursing homes, 
railways, and carriers.9  In 1974, the Act was amended to cover virtually all 
state and local government employees.10  The constitutionality of this 
amendment was challenged in National League of Cities v. Usery and 
found to be unconstitutional.11  Less than a decade later, the Supreme Court 
overruled Usery and the “‘traditional governmental functions’ test” in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, thus allowing FLSA’s 
terms to apply to state and local government employees.12 
Congress exempted some state and local employees from the standard 
terms of the Act.  For example, § 207(k) of the Act applies to public 
agencies that employ persons in fire protection or law enforcement 
activities and allows public agencies to calculate their employees’ hours for 
overtime purposes according to work periods ranging between seven and 
twenty-eight days rather than on a workweek basis.13  The Department of 
 
 7. Michael Jilka, For Whom Does The Clock Tick: Public Employers' Liability For 
Overtime Compensation Under Federal Law, 63 J.  KAN. B. ASS’N 34, 35 (1994). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. The Supreme Court held that extending the FLSA to state and local governments 
when they performed traditional governmental functions violated the Tenth Amendment and 
exceeded Congress’s commerce clause power.  Id. 
 12. Id.  (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 
(1985)).  The Supreme Court held that the political process protected the states against 
excesses in congressional exercises of power under the Commerce Clause.  Id. 
 13. Id.  The full text of §207(k) (Employment by public agency engaged in fire 
protection or law enforcement activities) provides: 
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Labor (DOL) established regulations, pursuant to § 207(k), providing that 
employees of a public agency engaged in fire protection activities are 
entitled to overtime compensation at a rate of 1 1/2 times their regular wage 
rate to the extent they work more than fifty-three hours in a week (or an 
equivalent number in a work period longer than seven days).14 
Plaintiffs who establish a violation of the minimum wage or overtime 
compensation provisions can recover their back wages and an equal 
amount in liquidated damages.15  Further, plaintiffs are entitled to costs and 
reasonable attorneys’ fees.16  An employer's liability typically extends to 
back pay for the two years preceding the filing of the lawsuit, unless the 
violation is willful, in which case the period is extended to three years.17  
Congress later gave courts the “discretion not to award liquidated damages 
if the employer can show ‘to the satisfaction of the court that the act or 
omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had 
reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not in 
violation of the [FLSA].’”18 
In addition to clarifying when state and local governments would be 
liable to pay overtime to their public service employees, the DOL passed 
regulations interpreting the meaning of “fire protection activities.”  This 
 
No public agency shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) of this section 
with respect to the employment of any employee in fire protection activities or 
any employee in law enforcement activities (including security personnel in 
correctional institutions) if-- 
(1) in a work period of 28 consecutive days the employee receives for tours of 
duty which in the aggregate exceed the lesser of (A) 216 hours, or (B) the 
average number of hours (as determined by the Secretary pursuant to section 
6(c)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974) in tours of duty of 
employees engaged in such activities in work periods of 28 consecutive days in 
calendar year 1975; or 
(2) in the case of such an employee to whom a work period of at least 7 but less 
than 28 days applies, in his work period the employee receives for tours of duty 
which in the aggregate exceed a number of hours which bears the same ratio to 
the number of consecutive days in his work period as 216 hours (or if lower, the 
number of hours referred to in clause (B) of paragraph (1)) bears to 28 days, 
compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at 
which he is employed. 
 14. Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Emergency Medical Technicians, Paramedics, 
Ambulance Personnel and Rescue Service Workers as Fire Protection or Law Enforcement 
Personnel for Purposes of § 7(k) of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 207(k)) 
Providing Limited Exemption from Overtime Protection for Employees Engaged in Fire 
Protection or Law Enforcement Activities, 116 A.L.R. FED. 143 (2008). 
 15. Jilka, supra note 7, at 41. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 41-42 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1988)). 
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step was necessary since, prior to 1999, the FLSA did not define what this 
term meant.  The first such regulation established a four-part test to 
determine if an employee was involved in a fire protection activity.19  The 
DOL regulation stated that, for the purposes of § 207(k), an employee 
engaged in fire protection activities would be anyone: 
(1) who is employed by an organized fire department or fire 
protection district; (2) who has been trained to the extent required 
by State statute or local ordinance; (3) who has the legal authority 
and responsibility to engage in the prevention, control or 
extinguishment of a fire of any type; and (4) who performs 
activities which are required for, and directly concerned with, the 
prevention, control or extinguishment of fires, including such 
incidental non-firefighting functions as housekeeping, equipment 
maintenance, lecturing, attending community fire drills and 
inspecting homes and schools for fire hazards.20 
A separate Regulation provided that, even if employees satisfied the 
four part test of § 533.210(a), they might fall outside of the exemption if 
they participated in non-fire related activities that occupied more than 
twenty percent of their time.21 
In 1999, Congress amended the FLSA by adding § 203(y) in order to 
“clarify the overtime exemption for employees engaged in fire protection 
activities.”22 
 
 19. 29 C.F.R. § 553.210(a). 
 20. Id.  This regulation also states that the term covers: 
all such employees, regardless of their status as “trainee,” “probationary,” or 
“permanent,” or of their particular specialty or job title (e.g., firefighter, 
engineer, hose or ladder operator, fire specialist, fire inspector, lieutenant, 
captain, inspector, fire marshal, battalion chief, deputy chief, or chief). . . . The 
term would also include rescue and ambulance service personnel if such 
personnel form an integral part of the public agency's fire protection activities. 
 21. 29 C.F.R. § 553.212(a).  This regulation states: 
[e]mployees engaged in fire protection or law enforcement activities as 
described in §§ 553.210 and 553.211, may also engage in some nonexempt 
work which is not performed as an incident to or in conjunction with their fire 
protection or law enforcement activities.  For example, firefighters who work 
for forest conservation agencies may, during slack times, plant trees and 
perform other conservation activities unrelated to their firefighting duties.  The 
performance of such nonexempt work will not defeat either the section 
13(b)(20) or 7(k) exemptions unless it exceeds 20 percent of the total hours 
worked by that employee during the workweek or applicable work period.  A 
person who spends more than 20 percent of his/her working time in nonexempt 
activities is not considered to be an employee engaged in fire protection or law 
enforcement activities for purposes of this part. 
 22. Pub.L. No. 106-151, 113 Stat. 1731 (1999). 
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III.  OVERVIEW OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The circuit courts that have examined this issue have conducted 
thorough factual analyses of the plaintiff employees’ fire protection (or 
lack thereof) activities.  After exploring the factual similarities and 
differences between the employees in these cases, this Comment will lay 
out the different legal interpretations adopted by the circuits.  Through this 
process it will become clear that, while there are important factual 
differences between these cases, the circuit split is the result of contrasting 
legal interpretations and cannot be distinguished on purely factual grounds. 
A.  Fire Protection Activities of Personnel Involved in These Cases 
In Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia23 and Cleveland v. City of Los 
Angeles,24 the Third and Ninth Circuits, respectively, were confronted with 
how to interpret the FLSA’s overtime provision relating to fire protection 
activities.  Both courts adopted a narrow view of the fire protection 
exemption under somewhat similar factual circumstances.  In Lawrence, 
fire service paramedics (FSPs) sued their employer, the City of 
Philadelphia, for violating the overtime provisions of the FLSA.25  The City 
employed hundreds of FSPs who were assigned to forty different medic 
units and located in firehouses.26  Philadelphia concluded in the early 1970s 
that it needed individuals with paramedic abilities to become part of the 
Fire Department's emergency response team.27 
“In 1980, the City created a specific job classification for ‘fire 
paramedics.’”28  These individuals were fully trained as firefighters and 
paramedics.29  Because of the expense of sending firefighters to paramedic 
school, a cost which was increasing, the City started hiring trained 
paramedics in 1988.30 
The positions of firefighter and FSP are distinct within the 
Philadelphia Fire Department and differ in several respects.  One such area 
is training.  Whereas paramedic training takes about one year, firefighter 
training only takes sixteen weeks.31  While FSPs underwent instruction for 
fire suppression, this training only involved “basic-level instruction in 
some of the fundamentals of firefighting, hazardous materials incidents, 
 
 23. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 24. Cleveland v. City of Los Angeles, 420 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 25. Lawrence, 527 F. 3d at 303. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. (citation omitted). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 304. 
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safe operating procedures, driver training and departmental procedures.”32  
The purpose of this instruction was “to familiarize [the FSPs] with the 
operations of the people that they are going to be working with in the 
engines and the ladders, and also it’s familiarization training for [the FSPs] 
when they have to utilize certain firefighting equipment.”33  Upon 
completion of training, firefighters receive a “Firefighter I” certificate.34  
FSPs, on the other hand, receive a “Fire Service Paramedic Orientation” 
certificate.35 
Another area that distinguishes firefighters from FSPs is pay and 
status.  “Paramedics receive higher pay than firefighters generally, and if a 
paramedic wanted to switch jobs and become a firefighter, s/he would be 
considered to be ‘demot[ing] down.’”36 
After distinguishing the positions of firefighter from FSP, the Third 
Circuit proceeded to delve more deeply into the work requirements 
associated with the FSP position.  The FSP job description “states that the 
position involves ‘advanced life support and field paramedical work 
responding to emergency calls from the public to perform medical 
assistance with emphasis on the stabilization of patients to permit safe 
transport to a full-service medical facility’”.37 
The court relied heavily on this job description.  It stated: 
Every substantive aspect of the job description is medical in 
nature. . . .  The job description does not mention any fire 
protection related examples of work to be performed, or fire 
suppression skills needed to perform the job of an FSP, except 
that it does state that FSPs should receive orientation in the use of 
fire equipment “as applicable to paramedical work.”38 
The court supports this qualitative distinction with a quantitative one.  
It noted that “FSP dispatches to fire scenes account for only about one tenth 
of one percent (i.e., .1%) of FSP ambulance dispatches in a year . . . .”39 
The City of Philadelphia attempted to counter these arguments by 
pointing to the possibility that FSPs would be called upon to engage in fire 
protection activities.  Thus, the City emphasized the statement of a former 
 
 32. Id. at 308 (citation omitted). 
 33. Id. at 309 (citation omitted). 
 34. Id. at 304. 
 35. Id. at 308. 
 36. Id. at 304 (citation omitted). 
 37. Id. at 305 (citation omitted).  The court goes on to detail other job requirements, 
such as the ability “to observe patients' vital signs, clean wounds, treat burns, administer 
drugs, and prepare reports on each treatment given.”  Id. 
 38. Id. (citation omitted). 
 39. Id.  The lack of dispatches results from FSPs not always being dispatched to fire 
scenes.  FSPs are only sent to fire scenes when the Fire Communications Center determines 
it is necessary.  Id. 
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Fire Commissioner that “FSPs are trained in fire suppression so that they 
‘can provide fire suppression if called upon to do so by their incident 
commander or by other circumstances.’”40  The City also pointed to the 
FSP Code of Conduct, which FSPs are required to sign in order to graduate 
from the Fire Academy.  In this Code, the cadet “recognize[s] [his or her] 
responsibility to render Fire Suppression.”41 
The Third Circuit found the City’s arguments unpersuasive.  
Countering these arguments, the court noted that “the City could cite no 
instance in which an FSP was called upon to enter a burning building to put 
out a fire, or was expected to perform any fire suppression duty other than a 
few marginal instances involving nothing more than moving a hose line.”42  
Moreover, the court, with one exception, found that FSPs had not been 
ordered by superior fire officials to use a hose to fight a fire or to engage in 
other fire suppression activities.  The one exception was when a fire officer 
ordered a paramedic to move a hose over a fence.43 
In Cleveland v. City of Los Angeles, 119 employees of the City of Los 
Angeles sued over the application of the fire protection exemption.44  These 
employees were fully trained and certified in both fire suppression skills 
and advanced life support and were referred to as “dual function 
paramedics.”45  The City also employed single function paramedics who 
were not trained in fire suppression.46 
These dual function paramedics staffed ambulances and “were 
responsible for providing medical care, transporting patients to hospitals, 
maintaining the ambulances, and completing related paperwork.”47  
Distinguishing this group from firefighters, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
“[t]hey do not carry water, hoses, pumps, ladders, or fire suppression 
breathing equipment, nor do they carry any specialized extrication 
equipment, aside from a crow bar and a lock cutter.”48 
Additionally, paramedic ambulances usually were not dispatched to 
fire calls and only responded when there was a need for advanced medical 
services.49  When called to fire scenes, there was no evidence that these 
 
 40. Id. (citation omitted). 
 41. Id. (citation omitted). 
 42. Id.  The court also mentioned the testimony of a retired Fire Department Battalion 
Chief (a middle management safety officer) who stated that he “wouldn’t let [FSPs] 
anywhere near a fire building” and had “reprimanded a paramedic for going into a burning 
building to try to save . . . a kid.”  Id. at 306-07 (citation omitted). 
 43. Id. at 307. 
 44. Cleveland v. City of Los Angeles, 420 F.3d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 984. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  On average, plaintiffs responded to fire calls only once or twice a year.  Id. 
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dual function paramedics had ever been ordered to perform fire suppression 
when assigned to an ambulance.50 
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits faced different factual circumstances.  
In McGavock v. City of Water Valley, five firefighters sued the City of 
Water Valley, Mississippi.51  These firefighters had graduated from the fire 
academy with training in fire suppression, had legal authority to engage in 
fire suppression and had been called to extinguish, control, and prevent 
fires, as well as respond to emergency situations where life, property, or the 
environment was at risk.  These firefighters tried to argue that, even after 
the passage of      § 203(y), because they spent more than twenty percent of 
their workweek engaged in dispatching duties (as opposed to fire protection 
activities), they should not fall under the fire protection exemption.52  The 
court did not find this argument persuasive and found that the Water Valley 
firefighters fell squarely within § 203(y)’s terms.  It concluded: 
The only purpose of Congress in amending the statute that is 
clear to us, is that it intended all emergency medical technicians 
(EMTs) trained as firefighters and attached to a fire department 
to be considered employees engaged in fire protection activities 
even though they may spend one hundred percent of their time 
responding to medical emergencies.53 
In Huff v. DeKalb County, the defendants employed dual-function 
Firefighters/Paramedics and Fire Medics.54  They were fully trained and 
 
 50. Id.  However, these paramedics could volunteer to assist firefighters.  If they did 
not, no disciplinary action would be taken against them.  Id.  Summarizing the relevant 
facts, the court stated: 
(1) the paramedic ambulances do not carry firefighting equipment or breathing 
apparatuses; 
(2) a dispatcher does not know if he or she is sending single or dual function 
paramedics to a call; 
(3) paramedic ambulances are not regularly dispatched to fire scenes and are 
dispatched only when there appears to be a need for advanced life support 
medical services; 
(4) dual function paramedics are not expected to wear fire protective gear; 
(5) dual function paramedics are dispatched to a variety of incidents (e.g., 
vehicle accidents and crime scenes) at which they are expected to perform only 
medical services; and 
(6) there is no evidence that a dual function paramedic has ever been ordered to 
perform fire suppression. 
Id. at 990. 
 51. McGavock v. City of Water Valley, 452 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 427. 
 54. Huff v. DeKalb County, 516 F.3d 1273, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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certified in fire suppression and advanced life support.55  Beginning in 
2003, the County classified the NPQI plaintiffs as “Firefighter/Paramedics” 
and the NPQII plaintiffs as “Fire Medics,” and gave both groups 
responsibility for fire suppression.56  Furthermore, both groups could be 
assigned to fire apparatuses,57 were required to wear fire protection gear, 
and both had the legal authority and responsibility to prevent, control, and 
extinguish fires.58  If any of the plaintiffs refused to follow an order to fight 
a fire, they would be disciplined.59 
While the plaintiffs theoretically had these responsibilities, in 
actuality, at least for the NPQI-certified Firefighter/Paramedics, their fire 
suppression duties were minimal.  For example, Firefighter/Paramedics 
were not authorized to suppress a house fire (although they could be 
authorized to extinguish small fires, such as brush fires and perhaps 
exterior structure fires).60  These employees had “never engaged in or been 
ordered to extinguish, fight, or suppress a fire.”61  Fire Medics, on the other 
hand, “are required to perform firefighting and ‘to improve knowledge and 
skill in all areas related to fire fighting and life rescue.’”62  Their job 
description included performing fire control and suppression, and 
inspecting fire hydrants and fire station equipment.63 
The factual circumstances in Lawrence and Cleveland bear many 
similarities.  Most importantly, both courts reached the same factual 
conclusion that the employees in question provide medical assistance and 
not fire suppression services.  The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other 
hand, faced similar factual circumstances but ones that differed 
substantially from the Third and Ninth Circuits.  One conclusion that could 
be drawn from this discussion is that the circuits share similar legal 
interpretations of the FLSA and were simply confronted by different 
factual scenarios, which led to their different holdings.  Such a conclusion 
would be inaccurate, however.  The circuit split is not the result of courts 
deciding the cases based on the facts before them.  The split results from 
fundamentally different conceptions of how to interpret the FLSA.  
 
 55. Id.  The plaintiffs received National Professional Qualification I (“NPQI”) 
certification, which requires additional training beyond what is normally required for a 
firefighter in Georgia.  Some plaintiffs even received NPQII, an even higher level of 
certification.  Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Such apparatuses include “[r]escues, [t]rucks, [s]quads, [l]adders, [t]echnical 
[r]escue [t]rucks, or [e[ngines.”  Id. at 1275. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  (citation omitted). 
 63. Id. at 1276. 
HAIMESFINAL[1] 6/1/2010  10:29:36 AM 
2010] QUASI-FIREFIGHTERS AND THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 909 
 
Because the circuits are split on a matter of law, Supreme Court or 
congressional action is appropriate to resolve this issue. 
 
B.  Circuits’ Legal Interpretations of the Statute 
While there are four requirements in the FLSA for an employee to be 
engaged in fire protection activities, the circuit courts that have evaluated 
this issue have focused on two main issues.  As the Third Circuit noted, the 
dispute about employees engaging in fire protection activities depends on 
“whether FSPs are trained in fire suppression and have legal authority and 
responsibility to engage in fire suppression.”64  The circuit split in this area 
hinges on a fundamental disagreement on this topic, particularly what it 
means to have the responsibility to engage in fire suppression. 
The Third Circuit drew heavily from the Ninth Circuit’s analysis to 
determine what it means to be responsible for fire protection activities.  As 
the court noted, “[i]n order to be responsible for something, a person must 
be required to do it or be subject to penalty.  In other words, a 
responsibility is something that is mandatory and expected to be completed 
as part of someone's role or job.”65  Applying that conception of 
responsibility to the facts of the case before the court, the court noted that 
FSPs are not hired, nor expected to fight fires based on their job description 
and experience on the job.66  Thus, the court stated, “[t]here is no evidence 
of an FSP being disciplined for not engaging in fire suppression activities 
at a fire scene.  There is no evidence that FSPs are ever dispatched to a fire 
scene for the purpose of fighting a fire, not even in situations when a 
firefighter is unavailable.”67  Dismissing the time(s) when FSPs had been 
asked to move a fire hose, the court stated, “[s]uch minor assistance is not 
the ‘role’ or required duty of an FSP, and therefore does not fall within the 
plain meaning of the term ‘responsibility.’”68  The court also dismissed the 
fact that FSPs had signed a statement declaring their responsibility for fire 
suppression.69  The court concluded that this fact did “not mean that FSPs 
have legal authority and responsibility to engage in fire suppression 
activities; it simply means that the Fire Department required them to sign 
such a statement in order to retain their jobs.”70 
In Cleveland, the Ninth Circuit similarly narrowed its focus to what, if 
 
 64. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 65. Id. at 317 (citing Cleveland v. City of Los Angeles, 420 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 
2005)). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 318. 
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any, responsibility the plaintiffs bore for fire suppression.  Here, the 
plaintiffs asserted that: 
(1) they do not have the ‘responsibility’ to engage in fire 
suppression (citation omitted); (2) they do not, in fact, engage in 
fire suppression and are not regularly dispatched to fire scenes 
(citation omitted); and (3) the exemption is inapplicable because 
Plaintiffs spent more than twenty percent of their time engaged in 
nonexempt work (work that is not performed incident to or in 
conjunction with their fire protection) because they devote the 
vast majority of their time to providing medical services.71 
Congress enacted § 203(y) three months after plaintiffs filed their 
suit.72  Because the court concluded that the twenty percent standard no 
longer applied since § 203(y) displaced the DOL’s regulations, the court 
focused on what the word “responsibility” meant in the FLSA.73  To 
perform this analysis, it turned to dictionary definitions of responsibility.  
This analysis led it to conclude that responsibility meant “‘a duty, 
obligation or burden’” and to be responsible meant “‘expected or obliged to 
account (for something, to someone), answerable, accountable’ and 
‘involving accountability, obligation or duties[;] [r]esponsible applies to 
one who has been delegated some duty or responsibility by one in authority 
and who is subject to penalty in case of default.’”74 
Applying this definitional analysis to the facts at hand, the court 
concluded that for plaintiffs to have responsibility for fire suppression 
“they must have some real obligation or duty to do so.  If a fire occurs, it 
must be their job to deal with it.”75  The Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary 
to consider legislative intent since it found the term “responsibility” to be 
clear in the statute.  The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have the 
responsibility to engage in fire suppression and thus did not fall under the 
FLSA exemption.76 
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, adopted a very 
different view on the meaning of responsibility in § 203(y).  At first blush, 
the Eleventh Circuit appears to distinguish the facts of Huff from 
 
 71. Cleveland v. City of Los Angeles, 420 F.3d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation 
omitted). 
 72. Id. at 987. 
 73. The circuits that have examined § 203(y) have concluded that it displaces the 
DOL’s regulations.  Thus, the 80/20 provision is no longer applicable in determining who is 
determined to be an employee engaged in fire protection activities.  See, e.g., Huff v. 
DeKalb County, 516 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The Plaintiffs argue that the 
regulatory definition of ‘employee in fire protection activities,’ particularly the 80/20 Rule, 
still applies.  We disagree.”). 
 74. Cleveland, 420 F.3d at 989 (citations omitted). 
 75. Id. at 990. 
 76. Id. at 991. 
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Cleveland.  It points out that “[t]here is undisputed testimony that all 
Plaintiffs are qualified to engage in fire suppression and must do so if 
ordered, whereas the Cleveland plaintiffs had no such obligation.”77  
However, a closer examination of the opinion makes clear that the real 
distinction between the cases is how the courts define responsibility. 
For the Eleventh Circuit, responsibility “does not imply any actual 
engagement in fire suppression, and employees may have a ‘responsibility 
to engage in fire suppression’ without ever actually engaging in fire 
suppression themselves.  This ‘responsibility’ is a forward-looking, 
affirmative duty or obligation that an employee may have at some point in 
the future.”78  The court reached this conclusion because of the disjunctive 
nature of the requirements in § 203(y).  As the court stated, “‘[e]mployee in 
fire protection activities' means an employee . . . [who] . . . is engaged in 
the prevention, control, and extinguishment of fires or response to 
emergency situations where life, property, or the environment is at risk.”79  
Since employees fall under the second prong of the exemption even if they 
only respond to emergency situations, the court concluded there is no 
statutory requirement that there be any level of actual engagement in fire 
suppression.80 
The court also pointed out the perverse incentive that the opposite 
interpretation provides because “if we read ‘responsibility’ to require actual 
engagement in fire suppression, DeKalb County could simply assign its 
paramedics (who already meet the other requirements of § 203(y)) to 
perform fire suppression activities occasionally, for the sole purpose of 
exempting them from the FLSA forty hour overtime standard.”81 
The Fifth Circuit also reached the conclusion that responsibility 
implied no actual engagement with fighting fires.  As the court noted, 
The only purpose of Congress in amending the statute that is 
clear to us, is that it intended all emergency medical technicians 
(EMTs) trained as firefighters and attached to a fire department 
to be considered employees engaged in fire protection activities 
even though they may spend one hundred percent of their time 
responding to medical emergencies.82 
As the quote above indicates, the Fifth Circuit found Congress’s intent 
in amending the FLSA to be clear.  The Eleventh, Third, and Ninth Circuits 
 
 77. Huff, 516 F.3d at 1279. 
 78. Id. at 1281. 
 79. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(y) (2006)) (emphasis added). 
 80. Id.  The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed this decision in Gonzalez v. City of Deerfield 
Beach, 549 F.3d 1331, 1336 (2008). 
 81. Id. at 1281. 
 82. McGavock v. City of Water Valley, 452 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis 
added). 
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also agreed that the statutory language was not ambiguous.83  The Third 
Circuit, however, “in an abundance of caution,” consulted legislative intent 
to determine its meaning.84  The fact that four circuit courts found the 
language to be clear, yet reached different conclusions as to what this 
“clear” language meant (and one of the circuit’s fractured by reaching 
different conclusions), should give pause to the assumption that the 
language is unambiguous.  Thus, evaluating legislative intent is a 
worthwhile endeavor. 
The majority opinion in Lawrence v. Philadelphia argued that 
congressional intent supported its interpretation of § 203(y) that the 
employees in question were exempt from the fire protection exemption.  To 
this end, the court cited three congressmen’s views on the bill.  Thus, they 
noted that the amendment’s sponsor, Representative Ehrlich, stated that it 
“‘seeks to clarify the definition of a fire protection employee,’ which had 
been rendered unclear due to recent inconsistent court interpretations.”85  
Rep. Boehner thought the purpose of the amendment was to ensure “‘that 
firefighters who are crosstrained as emergency medical technicians, 
HAZMAT responders and search and rescue specialists would be covered 
by the exemption even though they may not spend all of their time 
performing activities directly related to fire protection.’”86  Finally, the 
court quoted Rep. Clay stating that: 
[U]nder the 1985 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
the [§ 207(k)] exemption was intended to apply to all firefighters 
who perform normal firefighting duties.  [The amendment] 
provides that where firefighters are cross-trained and are 
expected to perform both firefighting and emergency medical 
services, they will be treated as firefighters for the purpose of 
overtime.  However, where emergency medical technicians are 
not cross-trained as firefighters, they will remain outside the 
purview of [§ 207(k)] and [sic] will be entitled to overtime after 
40 hours a week, even if the emergency medical services are 
placed within the fire department.87 
These statements led the majority to conclude that “Congress intended 
that true dual function paramedics, that is, individuals who were no doubt 
firefighters but also performed various other functions within a fire 
department, would fall within the exemption.”88  These statements, 
 
 83. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 318 (3d Cir. 2008); Huff, 516 F.3d at 
1280; Cleveland v. City of Los Angeles, 420 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 84. Lawrence, 527 F.3d at 318. 
 85. Id. at 312 (quoting 145 Cong. Rec. 28, 521 (1999) (statement of Rep. Ehrlich)). 
 86. Id. (quoting 145 Cong. Rec. 28, 520 (1999) (statement of Rep. Boehner)). 
 87. Id. (quoting 145 Cong. Rec. 28, 520 (1999) (statement of Rep. Clay)). 
 88. Id. at 318. 
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however, are relatively neutral as to whether quasi-firefighters of the sort 
before the Third Circuit should be exempt or not.  As the statement of Rep. 
Clay demonstrates, assuming that these statements actually reflect 
Congress’s intent in passing the amendment, it is unclear if Congress 
intended EMTs who have some of the same training as firefighters to be 
sufficiently cross-trained to fall within the amendment’s exemption. 
The dissent in Lawrence believed this was Congress’s intent.  
Drawing on additional comments of the congressmen cited by the majority, 
the dissent found that the impetus behind the amendment was to lessen the 
financial liability faced by municipalities from quasi-firefighters 
successfully suing their employers.  Thus, Rep. Ehrlich “noted that a 
municipality in his district had recently been found liable for $3.5 million 
under the FLSA, and that the potential consequences of such cases were 
‘serious and far-reaching and could result in a dramatic increase in the local 
costs of fire protection to taxpayers nationwide.’”89  Rep. Boehner noted 
that “the narrowing of the exemption by the courts had ‘resulted in State 
and local governments being liable for millions of dollar [sic] in back pay, 
attorneys fees and court costs.’”90 
There is debate about the relevance of a few congressional members’ 
statements about a bill in determining Congress’s intent behind passing 
legislation.  While it appears that the Lawrence dissent more accurately 
captures congressional sentiment behind the amendment to the FLSA, this 
sentiment is unclear and does not definitively determine how to interpret 
the FLSA.  Given the current situation (no further congressional action and 
no certiorari), the best answer lies in applying the tools of statutory 
construction that the Supreme Court has provided to the FLSA.  This 
analysis shows that the interpretation embraced by the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits, and the dissent from the Third Circuit, more faithfully honors the 
language of the FLSA. 
IV.  APPLYING TOOLS OF STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
This Part describes the guidance provided by the Supreme Court for 
interpreting legislation and applies this guidance to the factual situation in 
Lawrence.  Lawrence was selected as the test case because the FSPs there 
depart most from the standard firefighting employee.  If, as I argue, these 
employees should rightly be exempted,91 these cases become easier to 
 
 89. Id. at 324 (quoting 145 Cong. Rec. H11,500 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of 
Rep. Ehrlich)). 
 90. Id. (quoting 145 Cong. Rec. H11,500 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Rep. 
Boehner)). 
 91. This position is not a normative one (i.e., about whether quasi-firefighters should be 
entitled to greater overtime benefits).  It is based on applying the tools of statutory analysis 
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decide and much of the confusion in this area dissipates. 
The Supreme Court has been clear that the legislation in question is 
the starting point, and often the end point, for statutory analysis.  In Hughes 
Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, the Court stated that “as in any case of statutory 
construction, our analysis begins with ‘the language of the statute.’”92  The 
first step in the Court’s analysis is to determine if the language in question 
is plain and unambiguous.93  If this question is answered in the affirmative 
and “‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,’” then the “inquiry 
must cease.”94  In order to determine if the language is clear or ambiguous, 
the Court looks to “the language itself, the specific context in which that 
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”95 
The Supreme Court’s analysis does not focus on words in isolation but 
in the context of the words around it and the legislation as a whole.96  Part 
of the Court’s concern with context is ensuring that the Court gives full 
meaning to all of the legislation and that its interpretation of one part of the 
legislation does not render another part contradictory or moot.  Thus, the 
Court has stated that “‘[j]udges should hesitate . . . to treat [as surplusage] 
statutory terms in any setting.’”97  The Court has also expressed “deep 
reluctance . . . to render superfluous other provisions in the same 
enactment.”98 
The Supreme Court has been remarkably consistent in this area.  As 
far back as 1883, the Court stated that it had a duty “‘to give effect, if 
possible, to every clause and word of a statute.’”99  Thus, the Court has 
been consistent and clear that, when performing statutory analysis, the key 
is to look at the words the legislature has chosen and their context so as not 
to render inconsequential any of the words in the act. 
Apart from this general guidance on statutory interpretation, the 
Supreme Court has provided specific guidance on interpreting the FLSA.  
As the majority noted in Lawrence, “[t]here are additional considerations in 
an FLSA case because the FLSA must be construed liberally in favor of 
 
elucidated by the Supreme Court to interpret the FLSA’s language. 
 92. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (quoting Estate of 
Cowart v. Nickolas Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992)). 
 93. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (stating the above 
proposition). 
 94. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)). 
 95. Id. at 341 (citations omitted). 
 96. See Bailey v. U.S., 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (“We consider not only the bare 
meaning of the word but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.  ‘[T]he 
meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context’”) (citation omitted). 
 97. Id. (quoting Ratzalf v. U.S., 510 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1994)). 
 98. Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990). 
 99. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (quoting Inhabitants of 
Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)). 
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employees.”100  In this area, the general rules of statutory interpretation and 
the precedent that FLSA exemptions are to be construed narrowly pull in 
opposite directions.  Since the language that Congress chose to draft and 
pass broadens the exemption, this interpretation should control and leads to 
the conclusion that quasi-firefighters, like the FSPs in Lawrence, fall within 
the fire protection exemption. 
Much of the disagreement among the circuits stems from their 
differing interpretations of “responsibility.”  It is difficult to critique their 
interpretations of responsibility because the statute does not define the term 
and the circuits can rightly say that their interpretation is based on a 
common acceptance of the word’s meaning.  However, the word 
responsibility does not have only one meaning and the circuits have chosen 
to emphasize different definitions in their analyses. 
The Third and Ninth Circuits embrace the following definition of 
responsibility: 
In order to be responsible for something, a person must be 
required to do it or be subject to penalty. . . .  In other words, a 
responsibility is something that is mandatory and expected to be 
completed as part of someone's role or job.101 
For the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, responsibility “does not imply any 
actual engagement in fire suppression, and employees may have a 
‘responsibility to engage in fire suppression’ without ever actually 
engaging in fire suppression themselves.  This ‘responsibility’ is a forward-
looking, affirmative duty or obligation that an employee may have at some 
point in the future.”102 
It is difficult to distinguish which side of the circuit split has the 
proper interpretation of the FLSA based solely on its analysis of the 
meaning of responsibility.  Both sides agree that the definition of 
responsibility is at the heart of this issue and can confidently assert that 
they have applied a proper definition for the term.  While difficult, 
however, the conclusion still stands that, even embracing the narrower 
definition of responsibility, the Third Circuit reached the wrong legal 
conclusion by holding that FSPs did not fall within the fire protection 
exception. 
 
 100. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008).  For this proposition, 
the majority cited Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981) 
(“explaining that the purpose of the FLSA is to protect workers from substandard wages and 
oppressive working hours”) and Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960) 
(“emphasizing limited application to be given an exemption from the FLSA provisions”).  
The majority also stated that “[a]n employer seeking to apply an exemption to the FLSA 
must prove that the employee and/or employer comes ‘plainly and unmistakably’ within the 
exemption's terms.”  Lawrence, 527 F.3d at 310 (citations omitted). 
 101. Lawrence, 527 F.3d at 317 (citations omitted). 
 102. Huff v. DeKalb County, 516 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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Based on the Third and Ninth Circuits’ definitions of responsibility, 
FSPs would only fall within the fire protection exemption if they could be 
held accountable for fire suppression activities or subjected to discipline if 
they failed to engage in such activities.  While FSPs at no time directly 
engaged in fire suppression (apart from moving a hose), they were 
accountable, and potentially subject to discipline, for their actions related to 
fire suppression.  FSPs are required to sign the FSP Code of Conduct in 
order to graduate from the Fire Academy.  In this code, the cadet 
“‘recognize[s] [his or her] responsibility to render Fire Suppression.’”103  In 
addition to acknowledging their responsibility to engage in fire 
suppression, eleven FSPs (ten of them plaintiffs) also stated that they had to 
obey the orders of their Incident Commander, which lawfully include 
engaging in fire suppression,104 and would be disciplined if they did not do 
so.105  Embracing the Third and Ninth Circuits’ narrow definition of 
responsibility and applying that definition to personnel whose fire 
suppression duties differ greatly from the standard firefighter job 
description demonstrates that the proper interpretation of the FLSA will 
result in the vast majority of quasi-firefighters falling within the fire 
protection exemption. 
While this conclusion seems like a close call given the multiple 
definitions of “responsibility” and the various ways that fire departments 
could choose to structure their operations (e.g., text of cadet oaths, powers 
and authority of the incident commander), an analysis of the term 
“responsibility” within the broader context of § 203(y) makes clear that the 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ interpretation of the FLSA is the proper one. 
The flaw in the Third and Ninth Circuits’ reasoning is that their 
interpretation renders key portions of § 203(y) superfluous and thus 
disregards Supreme Court guidance on statutory interpretation.  As the 
dissent in Lawrence notes: 
If employees must satisfy § 203(y)(1) by being ‘hired to fight 
fires’ and ‘expected to fight fires as part of their job duties,’ it 
necessarily follows that they are ‘engaged in the prevention, 
control, and extinguishment of fires’ and the first clause of § 
 
 103. Lawrence, 527 F.3d at 306 (citation omitted). 
 104. In Lawrence, the dissent noted that: 
[B]oth current Commissioner Lloyd Ayers and former Commissioner Harold 
Hairston made clear that the Incident Commander possesses broad discretion to 
‘direct or redirect any fire service person, fire service paramedic, or firefighter, 
in any manner he or she believes will result in the safest environment for 
civilians and firefighters and efficient suppression of fire,’ and that FSPs were 
accordingly authorized ‘to engage in fire suppression on firegrounds if needed 
and as directed by an Incident Commander.’ Lawrence, 527 F.3d at 326 
(Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
 105. See id. at 326-27 (quoting plaintiffs’ testimony in support of this assertion). 
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203(y)(2) is redundant.106 
Looking beyond § 203(y)(1) shows that the narrow definition of 
responsibility embraced by the Third and Ninth Circuits is not the 
appropriate way to interpret the Act.  If this narrow definition was the 
proper interpretation, there would have been no need for Congress to insert 
the first part of § 203(y)(2).  That Congress did insert this language shows 
that it meant responsibility to convey a potential, if unrealized, obligation 
as the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits concluded. 
The addition of § 203(y)(2) strongly indicates that Congress did not 
envision any requirement that quasi-firefighters actually engage in fire 
suppression to fall within the fire protection exemption.  The first part of § 
203(y)(2) conveys that “responsibility” in § 203(y)(1) does not mean that 
these employees are actually engaging in fire suppression.  While the first 
part of § 203(y)(2) does establish a requirement that the employees engage 
in fire suppression activities, this requirement is not absolute, but merely 
part of a disjunctive test.  For employees to be engaged in fire protection 
activities, they must satisfy the terms of § 203(y)(1) and be “engaged in the 
prevention, control, and extinguishment of fires or response to emergency 
situations where life, property, or the environment is at risk.”107  Thus, the 
second part of the test in § 203(y)(2) establishes that there is no 
requirement that quasi-firefighters actually engage, or are hired to engage, 
in fire suppression.108 
This interpretation is supported by the introductory clause to § 203(y).  
This clause states that “‘[e]mployee in fire protection activities' means an 
employee, including a firefighter, paramedic, emergency medical 
technician, rescue worker, ambulance personnel, or hazardous materials 
worker.”109  As the dissent in Lawrence notes, “Congress's enumeration of 
various job titles, in addition to that of firefighter, undermines the 
majority's conclusion that the exemption applies only to employees hired 
exclusively, primarily, or periodically ‘to fight fires.’”110 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Under the interpretation of § 203(y) that is most faithful to Supreme 
Court precedent, all of the employees in the circuit cases discussed in this 
 
 106. Id. at 322-23. 
 107. 29 U.S.C. § 203(y)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 108. See Lawrence, 527 F.3d at 323 (“[T]he use of the disjunctive in § 203(y)(2) 
demonstrates that ‘there is no statutory requirement that there be any level of actual 
engagement in fire suppression’”) (quoting Huff v. DeKalb County, 516 F.3d 1273, 1281 
(11th Cir. 2008)). 
 109. 29 U.S.C. § 203(y) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 110. Lawrence, 527 F.3d at 324. 
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Comment would fall within the fire protection exemption.111  The 
employees were trained in fire suppression; had the legal authority and 
responsibility (a forward-looking, potential responsibility) to respond to 
fires; were employed by a fire department of the relevant political entity; 
and, where not directly engaged in the prevention, control, and 
extinguishment of fires, responded to emergency situations where life, 
property, or the environment were at risk.  Embracing this interpretation 
leads to the conclusion that the FSPs in Lawrence, even though they never 
did more than move a hose in response to a fire, fall within the fire 
protection exemption. 
While this conclusion is in some tension with how the Supreme Court 
usually interprets the Act because it broadens an FLSA exemption, it is 
more faithful to the statutory language and other Supreme Court precedent 
going back more than a hundred years and reaffirmed repeatedly.  If the 
circuits were to embrace this interpretation, much, if not all, of the 
confusion surrounding § 203(y) would disappear because it clarifies many 
of the terms that have caused the circuit split.  While this Comment has 
asserted that there is a proper interpretation for § 203(y), the strong circuit 
divide on questions of law requires clarification from above.  This 
clarification could take one of two forms:  congressional or Supreme Court 
action. 
While both of these institutions face many pressing issues, this one 
deserves attention for a variety of reasons.  First, Congress felt strongly 
enough about confusion in this area to amend the FLSA in 1999, only to 
find that its amendment has engendered additional confusion.  Second, 
given current economic conditions, from which municipalities are suffering 
greatly, it is critical for cities’ ability to plan and budget that they know 
what actions will expose them to liability for FLSA violations. 
For congressional action, the solution hinges on properly defining 
“responsibility.”  The definition embraced by the Fifth and Eleventh 
 
 111. Based on the descriptions of cases provided in this Comment, it may appear that the 
dual function paramedics in Cleveland v. City of Los Angeles would not meet the criteria of 
having the legal authority and responsibility for engaging in fire suppression.  See Cleveland 
v. City of Los Angeles, 420 F.3d 981, 982 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that while working as 
paramedics, dual function paramedics are not responsible for engaging in fire prevention).  
This view is incorrect.  The dual function paramedics in Los Angeles may be assigned to 
fire trucks or paramedic ambulances.   Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, Cleveland v. City of 
Los Angeles, 420 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-55505), 2003 WL 22752490.  The 
plaintiffs in that case were arguing that they should not fall within the fire protection 
exemption while assigned to ambulances, but conceded that they did fall within the 
exemption during their assignments to fire trucks.  Id. at 4-5.  However, these paramedics 
can be ordered to transfer between these vehicles during the course of a single shift.  Id. at 5.  
Thus, these paramedics “have the legal authority to fight fires, and — because they may be 
ordered to fight fires within the course and scope of their employment — they have the 
responsibility to engage in fire suppression.”  Id. at 8. 
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Circuits has two benefits:  it appears consistent with the congressional 
intent behind the 1999 amendment of the FLSA, and it would eliminate 
disputes over how much time quasi-firefighters spend engaging in fire 
suppression activities (since this question would be irrelevant to the 
analysis).  Similarly, the Supreme Court solution involves embracing the 
interpretations of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits (or the dissent in the Third 
Circuit) and their definition of responsibility.  While this interpretation 
would not provide many quasi-firefighters with the additional overtime 
they desire, it would alleviate confusion regarding their schedules and 
allow them and their employers to better structure their work environment.  
It would also rescue the circuits from a fundamental divide which leaves 
both employees and employers uncertain about their rights and 
responsibilities. 
